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the low-wage sector of employment. The findings in the paper inform policymakers that the tax wedge on labour in the Euro area is among the highest in the world, negatively impacting economic growth, employment, and competitiveness. In 2013-2014, about half of the Euro area member states received a country-specific recommendation to address this issue in the context of the European Semester.
The research methodology is based on an analysis of indicators characterising employment, wages, household incomes and the general government budget, and on research into economic and scientific literature as well as reports of the government and international organizations. A big part of the study is a descriptive analysis of the tax reform with some speculations concerning what impact the reforms might have. We calculated tax wedge indicators using mostly data available at the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Eurostat and the Ministry of Finance of Latvia. Our analysis of the impact of tax reforms shows a great variation among different groups of wage-earners. It will be more beneficial for those with dependants and for lowwage earners. However, the progressivity of labour taxes will remain low.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section two analyses the impact of the economic crisis of 2008-2010 on the labour market, public finances and income distribution, identifying the challenges to be solved by means of forthcoming reforms. Section three shows theoretical interrelations between taxes and employment. Section four analyses initial results of implemented reforms, and section five contains conclusions on the achievements and drawbacks of the reforms, as well provides recommendation for further work.
tHe econoMIc cRIsIs In latVIa anD Its IMPact on tHe laboUR MaRket anD on tHe wealtH of tHe PoPUlatIon

DeVeloPMent of GRoss DoMestIc PRoDUct, eMPloYMent anD waGes
In the years 2008-2010, Latvia suffered a serious economic downturn. The global liquidity and confidence crisis led to short-term liquidity problems and, consequently, to the takeover of one of the largest domestic banks of Latvia by the government in late 2008. This deepened the already growing problems faced by public sector finances. In addition, at that time Latvia faced both a cyclical and a structural crisis as during the preceding boom years the economy had accumulated imbalances in the real estate sector, as well as in the labour and financial markets and was growing way above its potential level in an unsustainable growth path (Kasjanovs and Kasjanova, 2011) . During these three years real GDP in total declined by 21 percent.
The crisis had a significant impact on employment in Latvia. The labour market conditions deteriorated rapidly and at the beginning of 2010 the unemployment rate reached 21. The crisis caused significant changes in the structure of economic sectors. For example, employment in the construction sector almost halved (table 1) . In the first phase of the recovery, job matching (Beveridge curve) was indicative of the flexible and effective labour market in Latvia (Zasova, 2011) . However, there is a substantial risk of an increase in structural unemployment because of a possible mismatch between employees' skills and the requirements of new job opportunities if the unemployment rate remains at a high level for a longer period of time.
Long-term unemployment causes economic costs due to deterioration in the skills and employability of those people outside the workforce. An increase in discouraged jobseekers also stimulates outward migration, which according to estimates during 2009-2010 reached 70 thousand people for the three year period (Hazans, 2011) . Considering the existing negative natural demographic growth in Latvia this potentially harms the long-term growth prospects of the country.
High unemployment and the policy of internal devaluation (e.g. cutting wages in the public sector) soon led to a decrease in labour income. In 2009, the average wage, compared to the previous year, decreased by 3.9 per cent, and in 2010 by another 3.5 per cent. Furthermore, the share of minimum wage earners increased substantially up to 30 per cent of total employment, but the share and number of those employees with income close to an average wage (an interval from 427 to 711 euro per month) decreased (see figure 2 ). The shadow economy in Latvia peaked in 2010 (Putniņš and Sauka, 2014) . Therefore the share of minimum wage earners could be one of the indicators of increased underreporting, and it also undeniably shows a real increase in the share of low-wage workers in total employment. Latvia responded to the crisis by maintaining its currency peg 2 and by an adjustment through internal devaluation and front-loaded consolidation, which included cutting public expenditures. The main rationale behind the choice of such a policy was that the country needed to address underlying structural inefficiencies in the economy. Internal devaluation is preferable to exchange rate devaluation, which offers only temporary relief from cost pressures while avoiding long overdue reforms (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011). In 2012, according to the data of the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB), poverty rates by household type show that families with dependent children, especially with three and more, and single-parent families, are at the highest risk of poverty (see figure 3 ). Before 2008, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for people of retirement age was twice as high as for children. After the crisis, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for children was two and even three times higher than for people of retirement age. This was a result of increased unemployment and decreased labour income at the time when pensions were exempted from consolidation measures due to a decision of the Constitutional Court.
Figure 3
At Income inequality is another concern that was revealed by the crisis. There are different theoretical views on this issue, but recent empirical evidence and works by development economists have created a broad international consensus that a more equal distribution of income strengthens aggregate demand, investment and growth. This, in turn, accelerates job creation, including high-productivity activities that offer better remuneration and social benefits, thereby further reducing inequality (UNCTAD, 2012). Tax and transfer systems reduce overall income inequality in all countries. On average across the OECD, three quarters of a reduction in equality is due to transfers, while the rest is due to direct household taxation (OECD, 2012).
In 2009, the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income amounting to 37.5 per cent in Latvia was the highest in the European Union (according to the Eurostat data in 2009 the EU-27 average was 30.5 percent), showing a necessity and possibilities for improving tax-benefit policies.
Labour market institutions such as taxes and benefit systems may cause additional problems to employment growth or provide disincentives especially for low-wage workers. One such indicator is the unemployment trap that measures the proportion of gross earning taxed away (by higher taxes and withdrawal of benefits) when shifting from unemployment to employment. Another measure is the low-wage trap that assesses the proportion of gross earnings taxed away (by higher taxes and withdrawal of benefits) when gross earnings increase (for the unemployment trap Eurostat uses earnings amounting to 67 per cent of an average wage, for the low-wage trap -a wage increase from 33 per cent to 67 per cent of an average wage).
In 2010, the unemployment trap in Latvia was 90.06, above the EU-27 average of 74.74, while the low-wage trap was 33.00 which is significantly lower than the EU-27 average of 47.46 (Eurostat data). This could be explained by the flat-rate personal income tax system with a low non-taxable threshold. It is noteworthy that since 1994 Latvia has had a flat income tax system, in which some progressivity has been achieved through the PIT basic allowance (non-taxable minimum) and the PIT allowance for dependants.
cHanGes In laboUR taXes DURInG tHe bUDGet consolIDatIon PeRIoD
The crisis had a significant impact on public finances. From 2004 to 2008, total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP increased from 27.8 per cent to 31.3 per cent due to high consumption-based economic growth. This upward trend was interrupted in 2009 due to rapid worsening of the economic situation. In 2010 the tax burden decreased to its lowest value since 1995, standing at 27.4 per cent of GDP, and total tax revenue in 2010 decreased by 2.2 billion euro from 2008, leading to unsustainable levels of budget deficit.
As a result of this loss in revenues, the government had to introduce major fiscal consolidation measures that amounted to a reduction in government expenditures totalling 16 per cent of GDP (as can be seen in Main consolidation measures took place on the expenditure side, but changes in taxation were also significant as tax rates and bases were increased in almost all tax categories (see table 3 ). Although the largest increase in taxes was attributed to consumption and property taxation, labour taxation was increased as well.
Before 2008, the Latvian government had the goal of reducing the tax burden on labour for low-income households through an increase of PIT allowances. The first consolidation package adopted at the end of 2008 also provided for cutting the PIT rate by 2 percentage points to 23 percent.
As the crisis and shortage of tax revenues proved to be much more severe than had been initially anticipated, this policy was soon reversed and the PIT rate was increased to 26 per cent in 2010. Moreover, the basic allowance that had been in- monthly gross salary in Latvia amounted to 655 euros). At the same time, the allowance for dependants was not changed and remained 90 euros per month. In a comparison of labour taxation in the Baltic region, where all countries use flat income tax rates, Latvia showed the highest PIT burden at the end of the crisis. This is especially true for below-average wages and is a result of the higher PIT rate and lower basic allowance. While in Latvia the PIT rate and the basic allowance changed almost each year during the period of 2009-2011 (see table 3 
cent (of which the employer rate was 31.7% and the employee rate was 9%), while in Latvia it was the lowest with 33.09 per cent (of which the employer rate was 24.09% and the employee rate was 9%). In Estonia the total SSC rate in 2010 was 38.0 per cent (of which the employer rate was 34.4% and the employee rate was 2.8%, the lowest among the Baltic States).
As result of changes in PIT, the tax wedge for low-wage earners increased in Latvia and in 2012 was one of the highest in the EU as well as higher than in the other Baltic States, Lithuania and Estonia (see figure 4) .
The tax wedge is an important issue for the whole of the EU and euro area given that the tax burden on labour in the euro area member states is among the highest in the world, negatively affecting both growth and employment (Dolenc and Laporšek, 2010) . Within the euro area, 11 countries face a particular challenge with regard to the high tax burden on labour. As reflected in the country specific recommendations (CSRs), these countries are: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (European Union Economic Policy Committee, 2014). Source: Eurostat.
The differences in the tax burden on labour in neighbouring countries with otherwise quite similar economic conditions gave reasons to worry about the cost competitiveness of Latvian companies and the possibilities of increasing investments in high labour intensity projects. 
a RatIonale of tHe laboUR taXes RefoRM
The following list summarizes the issues arising as consequences of the 2008-2010 crisis on the labour market and on the tax policy.
Weaknesses of the labour market:
-high unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, with all the associated economic and social costs; -emigration of discouraged jobseekers; -decreased participation rates.
Labour market institutions:
-high unemployment trap; -increased dependency on benefits; -high tax wedge for low-wage earners.
Barriers to economic development and growth: -role of taxes in regional cost competitiveness and job creation; -income inequality and a risk of poverty.
Labour taxes may affect all these issues, however, in different intensities. Nevertheless, their role as a source of revenue for the budget financing should also be taken into account.
tHeoRetIcal consIDeRatIons on tHe IMPact of laboUR taXes on eMPloYMent
Taxation of labour income can influence the employment level in an economy due to its effect on both unemployment level and the size of the labour force. Labour taxation drives a wedge between the total labour costs faced by employers and the real consumption wage received by employees. This will generally affect both labour demand and labour supply decisions (OECD, 2011).
In a perfectly competitive labour market, taxation would have no impact on unemployment as the real wage would adjust so that market would clear (OECD, 2011). Higher taxation would reduce the voluntary supply of labour if net wages were below the level acceptable to some individuals (thus increasing inactive population, but not affecting unemployment). In practice, however, taxation affects unemployment levels indirectly by alleviating or exacerbating non-tax distortions created by other labour market institutions -specifically by out-of-work benefits and wage setting institutions (OECD, 2011).
The effect of taxation on labour supply varies among different population groups. Individuals respond differently to changes in the real consumption wage depending on their individual preferences and family characteristics. Taxes affect decisions on participation, numbers of hours worked, but also on the amount of an effort an individual is willing to put into their work, including long-term decisions concerning occupation and education. Taxes also influence a decision to engage in tax avoidance or evasion (including working in the informal sector) (OECD, 2011).
The demand for labour is affected by the ratio of the tax wedge that is passed on to an employer.
The tax wedge is a difference between what employees take home in earnings (or net pay) and what it costs to employ them. Employer social security contributions and -in some countries -payroll taxes are added to gross wage earnings of employees in order to determine the measure of total labour costs (OECD, 2008).
The more elastic the labour supply (and/or demand) curve is, the more harmful the tax wedge for employment becomes. In case of standard, convex, aggregate labour supply (and demand) curves, a high tax wedge particularly affects earners of relatively low wages. Since one of the main factors explaining real wage differentials is skill level, one can argue that the negative impact on employment caused by the tax wedge is most severe for low-skilled workers (World Bank, 2005) . The situation in the low-wage segment of employment is made even more complex by other labour market institutions -such as minimum wage and social benefits creating, for example unemployment, inactivity and low-wage traps.
Empirical evidence suggests that low-income workers, single parents, second earners and older workers are relatively responsive to changes in taxation of labour income, particularly at the participation margin (OECD, 2011). In addition, taxable income elasticities suggest that higher-income individuals are more responsive to tax changes than middle-income and lower-income workers (OECD, 2011).
Consequently, there is a need to design a tax policy targeting individual employment groups at different income levels and family characteristics in order to address the most pressing issues efficiently with minimum fiscal costs.
A high tax burden on labour runs counter to the objective of boosting economic activity and increasing employment. In particular the interaction between a high tax burden on labour and a benefit system may create unemployment or inactivity traps for groups with high responsiveness to the wage level, such as low skilled and low-income earners. However, note that the tax wedge is not the only factor explaining the level of unemployment. In many EU member states there is a need for further structural reforms in order to ensure proper functioning of the labour markets, which should accompany measures to address the tax wedge in order to increase their employment effect (European Union, Economic Policy Committee, 2014). 
cHRonoloGY anD Goals of RefoRMs
Latvia's economy returned to growth at the end of 2010 (in the third quarter of 2010, the GDP growth rate was positive for the first time in nine consecutive quarters with 2.9 percent). However budget consolidation continued in 2011, as there was a necessity to decrease the budget deficit further and improve the sustainability of public finances. With regard to labour taxes, the government decided to adopt the following tax changes for 2011:
-to reduce the PIT rate from 26 per cent to 25 per cent, -to increase the basic allowance of PIT from 50 euros to 64 euros per month, -to increase the allowance for dependants of PIT from 90 euros to 100 euros per month, -to increase the SSC rate from 33.09 per cent to 35.09 per cent (an increase was fully implemented through the increased employee rate -from 9 per cent to 11 percent).
The goal of the government reform was to increase revenue of the state with focus on the social security budget, but at the same time to provide relief for low-wage earners as the tax burden increased only for those whose earnings were close to or above the average wage.
This reform helped to increase revenue and to improve the sustainability of the social security system, but the tax wedge for low-wage earners was not affected. This reform focused primarily on decreasing the labour costs of Latvian enterprises as well as on increasing their competitiveness in the region and thereby stimulating increase in overall economic activity and employment growth (Ministry of Finance of Latvia, 2012). This time, the labour tax reform did not provide any special measures for low-skilled jobseekers.
The decrease in the PIT rate started in 2013, but taking into account the fiscal costs for further steps of the adopted reform and the reform's impact on other labour market and growth problems such as unemployment traps or income inequality, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Welfare initiated discussions on changes in the adopted reform.
Taking into account Latvia's flat income tax, the main instruments to influence low-wage workers are the basic allowance and an allowance for each dependant. A decrease in the tax rate is more beneficial to better paid workers. It would be (Šņucins, 2012) .
In 2013, the EC, through its country-specific recommendations, indicated the need for appropriate calibration of the tax policy in order to stimulate employment for low-skilled people in Latvia (European Commission, 2013). In addition, the IMF pointed out that while some reduction in the tax wedge on labour would be desirable, untargeted cuts in the statutory PIT rate are not the first-best solution from an efficiency or equity perspective (IMF, 2013).
Taking into account these views as well as the debates between the government and its social partners (employers' organisations and trade unions), an agreement was reached that a reduction of income inequality and the support of employees with children (dependants) should be equally important goals of the labour tax reform in conjunction with a reduction of labour costs.
Thus, the reform was significantly adjusted. In 2014, the SSC rate was reduced by one percentage point and the PIT basic allowance and allowance for dependants were increased. In addition, the government plans a decrease of the PIT rate from 24% to 23% in 2015 and to 22% in 2016 (see table 4). 
eValUatIon of tHe RefoRMs
Since 2010, the economic situation in Latvia has markedly improved, showing a stable GDP growth above 4 per cent per year, a decrease in the unemployment rate and average wage increases along with increased productivity. However, it is too early to estimate the macroeconomic impact of the tax reforms as it takes time to influence the behaviour of economic agents.
Revenues from PIT and SSC have increased along with employment and wage increases (see figure 5 ). With decrease of the tax burden, the share of labour taxes as percentage of GDP becomes stable as employment and wages were increased and reporting was improved. This indicates that a comparatively large amount of tax revenue (approximately two per cent of GDP) was lost by the government in favour of households and businesses. Our analysis of the tax reforms impact shows a great variation among different groups of wage-earners. In summary, the tax reforms were generally more beneficial to families with children and for low-income earners.
For example, due to the reform in 2014 an employee with two dependants earning a gross wage of 450 euros per month will take home a net wage that is approximately 7.6 per cent higher in 2014 than in 2013. At the same time, an employee with two dependants and a gross wage of 1,500 euros per month will take home approximately three per cent more in 2014 than in 2013 (see table 5 ).
However, as can be seen from the shaded area in table 4, in some cases, when an employee has a low wage and two or more dependants, the expected benefit is lower than for an employee with the same gross wage, but with one dependant or without dependants. This is explained by the fact that the total amount of available tax allowance for an employee with a low wage and two or more dependants is higher than his gross wage. For example, for an employee with a gross wage of 386 350 euros per month and three children, the total calculated allowance will amount to 570 euros per month (the basic allowance of 75 euros per month + the allowance for dependants of 165 euros per month, multiplied by 3). As can be observed in figure 6 , the implemented and adopted tax changes will reduce the tax wedge in 2016 for all wage categories, especially for employees with children. However, they will not increase the existing small progressivity of labour taxation for single persons in Latvia. This means that the impact of reforms on another of the reform goals, the reduction of income inequality, is negligible.
Due to changes that will be adopted in 2016, the tax wedge in Latvia for low-wage earners will be near to that of other Baltic States and to the EU-27 average, reaching one of the goals of the reform (see figure 7) . As result of increased unemployment and decreased labour income, families with dependent children, especially with three and more, and single-parent families, were at the highest risk of poverty.
Income inequality is another issue that was revealed by the crisis. In 2009, the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income in Latvia was the highest in the EU, showing a necessity and possibilities for improving tax-benefit policies.
As a result of the loss in budget revenues, the government had to introduce major fiscal consolidation measures that in total amounted to 16 per cent of GDP. The main consolidation measures took place on the expenditure side, but changes in taxation were also significant because tax rates and bases were increased in almost all tax categories including labour taxes.
As result of such changes in labour taxes, the tax wedge in Latvia for low-wage earners in 2012 was 43.6 per cent, one of the highest in the EU (the EU-27 average was 39.9 per cent) and higher than in the other Baltic States (Lithuania: 39.2 per cent and Estonia: 39.2 per cent).
In 2011, the Latvian government started the labour tax reform by reducing the PIT rate by one percentage point, increasing the basic allowance as well as the allowance for dependants, but at the same time employee SSC rate was increased by two percentage points. The goal of this reform was to increase revenue of the state special social security budget while at the same time providing relief for lowwage earners as a tax burden was increased only for those whose earnings were near to or above an average wage.
The next post-crisis labour tax reform was adopted in 2012. It provided for a further reduction in the PIT rate and the allowance for dependants increased by mid-2013. A reduction of the PIT rate was introduced in 2013. However, taking into account the fiscal costs for further steps of the adopted reform and the reform's disregard of other labour market and growth problems such as unemployment traps or income inequality, at the end of 2013 the government decided to leave the PIT rate unchanged in 2014 and to reduce the rate from 24 per cent to 23 per cent in 2015 and to 22 per cent in 2016. Also starting in 2014, the allowance for dependants and the basic allowance were increased and the SSC rate was reduced by one percentage point (sharing 0.5 percentage points for employers and 0.5 percentage points for employees).
Our analysis of the impact of the tax reforms shows a great variation among different groups of wage-earners. It is more beneficial for those with dependants and for low-wage earners. We forecasted that in 2016, the tax wedge in Latvia for low-wage earners will be close to the other Baltic States and to the EU-27 average. However, the progressivity of labour taxes will remain low.
In order to achieve all the outlined goals of the reform, it is necessary to widen the scope of the reform, using more targeted tax allowances and providing more coordination with non-tax instruments.
The main labour tax changes were implemented recently, and the reforms are not yet completely finished. This makes evaluation of the results less efficient and suggests the need for further research in the future especially on the impact on various groups of wage-earners. 
